ABSTRACT: In this paper, I focus on the disputes arising in regions of discourse in which bare sentences with predicates of personal taste occur. After I introduce, in the first section, the distinction between the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning objective matters of fact and those arising in regions of discourse about subjective matters of personal taste, I present, in the second section, the solutions which the main semantic theories have offered to the puzzle of faultless disagreement. In the third and the fourth section of the paper, I discuss the proposal advocated by truth perspectivalism, according to which the disputes concerning matters of personal taste constitute faultless disagreements. After I present the solution proposed by Kölbl to an argument whose conclusion establishes that no disagreement can be faultless, I show that this solution presents major disadvantages for truth perspectivalism. These disadvantages highlight the fact that the disputes concerning matters of personal taste, as they are construed in truth perspectivalism, do not constitute authentic examples of faultless disagreements, and that the coherence of the semantic program which truth perspectivalism advocates, with regard to sentences from regions of discourse about matters of personal taste, must be put in doubt.

KEYWORDS: predicates of personal taste, truth perspectivalism, semantics, parameter, discourse, faultless disagreement

1. Introduction

In the discourse involved in day to day communication, there are some regions in which the language has a representational function which is best captured in terms of the truth-conditions the sentences from these regions possess. The meanings of the sentences from these areas of discourse are usually explained by means of the conditions which specify how the world has to be in order for the sentences to be true. The declarative sentences involved in these areas of discourse make them truth-apt in the sense that the semantic contents which the sentences's utterances express are truth-evaluable. Thus, if things in the world are exactly as how these sentences represent them to be, then their truth-conditions are satisfied and, consequently, the sentences are true. Insofar as the utterances of sentences from these regions of discourse concern matters of fact, a dispute involving two agents uttering contradictory sentences will have a faultness aspect. In cases like this one, given that the objects of the disputes are objective matters of
fact, one of the agents involved in the dispute will make an error with respect to facts. Consider a dispute in which the agents $i$ and $j$ utter, in the same context, the sentences [1] and [2] below:

[1] Shogaol is a chemical compound of ginger responsible for its taste.

[2] Shogaol is not a chemical compound of ginger responsible for its taste.

As far as the dispute exemplified here involves two contradictory utterances concerning an objective matter, there has to be a fact which settles the disagreement between $i$ and $j$. Given that the shogaol is indeed one of the chemical compounds of ginger responsible for its taste, it is obvious that the agent $j$ is at fault. In all the disputes of this kind, it is not possible for both agents to be right while having contrasting views about the particular disputed issues. All the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of fact are subject to what Crispin Wright has called the *constraint of cognitive command*. According to Wright, in order to exert a cognitive command, a particular region of discourse has to satisfy the condition defined by him as follows:

It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within (that) discourse, unless excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming.

There are, however, some regions of discourse which comprise sentences whose truth-values cannot be objectively determined and, consequently, are not subject to the above constraint of cognitive command. One example is the class of sentences in which occur predicates of personal taste, more precisely terms like delicious, fun, disgusting, boring and sexy. Even though the utterances of these sentences express truth-evaluable semantic contents, their truth-values no longer depend on objective facts in reality, but instead on irreducibly subjective aspects. The utterances of sentences formed with predicates of personal taste concern matters of opinion or, more precisely, subjective matters, not objective matters of fact. As they do not concern matters of fact, it is usually considered that, in a dispute involving two agents which utter contradictory sentences from the region of discourse concerning matters of personal taste no agent makes an error with

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respect to facts. Consider a dispute in which the agents $i$ and $j$ utter, in the same context, the sentences [3] and [4] below:


As far as the above dispute involves two contradictory utterances from the region of discourse concerning subjective matters, there is no fact which can settle the disagreement between $i$ and $j$. In this scenario, it is possible for both $i$ and $j$ to be right even though they entertain contrasting views about the particular disputed issue. As the regions of discourse in which sentences like [3] and [4] occur do not exert cognitive command, it is usually considered that the class of sentences formed with predicates of personal taste give rise to disagreements that are faultless. Such disagreements are defined as cases in which, given that two agents $i$ and $j$ utter, in the same context, the bare sentences $\varphi$ and $\neg \varphi$ containing the same predicates of personal taste, and that the semantic contents $[\varphi]$ and $[\neg \varphi]$ expressed by their utterances cannot be simultaneously true, the following two conditions are satisfied:\(^4\)

[a] The agent $i$ believes the proposition $[\varphi]$ and the agent $j$ believes the proposition $[\neg \varphi]$.

[b] Neither $i$ nor $j$ commits an error.

In this paper, I will focus on the disputes arising in regions of discourse in which bare sentences with predicates of personal taste occur. Accordingly, I will present, in the second section of the paper, how the disputes concerning matters of personal taste are framed in different semantic theories. In the third and the fourth section of the paper, I will discuss the faultless and the disagreement aspects of the disputes about subjective matters, as they are advocated in truth perspectivalism, and I will dispute the coherence of the proposal upheld by truth perspectivalism according to which the disputes involving sentences formed with predicates of personal taste give rise to faultless disagreements. After I present the solution proposed by Max Kölbél, one of the main proponents and defenders of the truth perspectivalism’s program concerning matters of personal taste, to an argument whose conclusion establishes that no disagreement can be faultless, I will show that this solution presents major disadvantages for truth perspectivalism. These disadvantages highlight the fact that, insofar as the disputes occurring in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste are

conceived in a truth perspectivalist manner, one cannot consider both that these disputes involve real disagreements and that they do not involve any error.

2. Solutions to the Puzzle of Faultless Disagreement

In this section, I will present how the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste are framed in different semantic theories. The main semantic theories which have offered solutions to the puzzle of faultless disagreement and which will be presented below are expressivism, invariantism and perspectivalism.

According to expressivism, the regions of discourse in which occur sentences formed with predicates of personal taste are not truth-apt.\(^5\) Consider a scenario in which Mihai and Irina utter, in the context of a dispute, the following sentences formed with the same predicate of personal taste:


According to expressivism, the utterances of [3] and [4] express the attitudes of the agents involved in the conversation: Mihai likes the taste of ginger while Irina doesn’t. In this theory, the above utterances do not express a semantic content and, as such, they don’t have a truth-value.\(^6\) Given that the sentences like [3] and [4] above belong to a region of discourse which, according to expressivism, is deprived of truth-conditions, the agents who utter them in a particular context will not assert anything and, therefore, they do not disagree. Insofar as the utterances of [3] and [4] do not express beliefs which Mihai and Irina have, but express instead their subjective attitudes toward the taste of ginger, neither of them commits an error.

As it was already mentioned at the end of the previous section, in order for a dispute which involve sentences from regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste to constitute a faultless disagreement, two conditions [a] and [b] must be satisfied. In expressivism, the condition [b], according to which neither agent involved in such a dispute commits an error, is satisfied. Insofar as, in expressivism, the utterances like [3] and [4] above do not have the function to express beliefs and to assert, the agents having a dispute about matters of personal taste do not disagree, and the condition [a] of the faultless disagreement, which

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demands that the agents involved in a dispute of this kind must believe the contradictory propositions their utterances express, is not satisfied.

In an opposite direction, invariantism erases the line dividing the regions of discourse concerning subjective matters of personal taste and the regions of discourse concerning objective matters of fact. According to invariantism, the predicate of personal taste occurring in the sentences [3] and [4] is similar to any other monadic predicate occurring in sentences concerning matters of fact. The invariantist advocates the idea that bare sentences formed with predicates of personal taste express, in all contexts of utterance, semantic contents whose truth-values can be determined in a completely objective way. In this theory, it is a matter of fact whether or not the ginger has the property of being tasty. The function of an utterance of a sentence from regions of discourse about matters of personal taste is, according to invariantism, to describe the world in a perspective-independent manner. In this regard, it is considered that the invariant semantic content expressed by the utterance of [3] is the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty], while that expressed by the utterance of [4] is the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is not tasty].

Insofar as the invariantist semantics treats the sentences formed with predicates of personal taste in the same manner in which the sentences from regions of discourse concerning matters of fact are treated, the discourse about matters of personal taste is subject to the constraint of cognitive command. Therefore, in any dispute similar to the above mentioned dispute involving the utterances of [3] and [4], the facts will settle the disagreement between the agents and, consequently, one of them will make an error with respect to how these facts are.

In this theory, the condition [a] of what has to be a faultless disagreement, according to which the agents involved in a dispute concerning matters of personal taste must believe the contradictory propositions their utterances express, is satisfied. But given that, according to invariantism, the regions of discourse concerning subjective matters exert cognitive command, the condition [b], which ensures that neither agent involved in such a dispute commits an error, is not satisfied.

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According to meaning perspectivalism, one of the two varieties of a perspectivalist semantic theory, the predicates of personal taste occurring in the sentences [3] and [4] mentioned above linguistically encode perspectival information, even though the information of this kind is not mentioned in the surface syntax of [3] and [4]. Insofar as the perspectival information is the value provided by the context to a parameter present at the level of the logical form of a sentence containing a predicate of personal taste, the perspectival information will enter in the propositions expressed by the utterances of bare sentences [3] and [4].10 Therefore, the semantic content which the utterance of the sentence [3] expresses, in the above scenario, is the perspective-specific proposition [Ginger is tasty to Mihai], while the semantic content expressed, in the same scenario, by the utterance of [4] is the perspective-specific proposition [Ginger is not tasty to Irina].11

In meaning perspectivalism, only the condition [b] of the faultless disagreement, according to which neither agent involved in a dispute about matters of personal taste is at fault, is satisfied. Insofar as meaning perspectivalism considers that the sentences [3] and [4] are context-sensitive and that the semantic contents expressed by their utterances are both true and compatible, the agents who believe the perspective-specific propositions expressed by the utterances of [3] and [4] do not disagree, and, in consequence, the condition [a] of what a faultless disagreement has to be is not satisfied.

According to the second variety of perspectivalist semantics, truth perspectivalism, any utterance of a sentence from the region of discourse concerning matters of personal taste expresses a semantic content which has the property to be contextually invariable. Therefore, different utterances of the same sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste, like [3] or [4] above, express one and the same semantic content.12 As in invariantism, the semantic contents expressed by the utterances of [3] and [4] are the perspective-neutral propositions [Ginger is tasty] and, respectively, [Ginger is not tasty].

Even though different utterances of a sentence in which occurs a predicate of personal taste express the same perspective-neutral proposition, their truth-values vary across contexts. In order to capture the variation in truth-values of the different utterances of one and the same sentence from a region of discourse concerning matters of personal taste, the proposal of truth perspectivalism is to introduce, in the circumstances with respect to which the utterances’ semantic contents are evaluated, a new parameter, namely a parameter for perspective. Insofar as the extension of a predicate of personal taste is considered, in truth perspectivalism, to vary according to the values of the parameter representing the perspective, this theory can explain the variation in truth-values of the different utterances of a sentence formed with a predicate of this kind, without having to appeal to meaning perspectivalism’s idea according to which the variation in the perspective-specific propositions expressed by the sentence in different contexts of utterance, explains the variation in truth-values of its utterances.

With regard to the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste, the proposal advocated by truth perspectivalists is that the disputes of this kind are best framed as faultless disagreements. According to this theory, both conditions [a] and [b] of what has to be a faultless disagreement are met. Insofar as the perspective-neutral propositions expressed by the utterances of [3] and [4] above are contradictory propositions, and as the agents involved in the dispute believe, each of them, the propositions expressed by their utterances, the first condition of a faultless disagreement is satisfied. To the extent that the perspective-neutral proposition expressed by the utterance of [3] is true with respect to Mihai’s perspective, while the perspective-neutral proposition expressed by the utterance of [4] is true with respect to Irina’s perspective, neither speaker is at fault in asserting what he believes and, in consequence, the second condition of the faultless disagreement is satisfied.

In the following sections, I will discuss the faultless and the disagreement aspects of the disputes about subjective matters as they are conceived in truth perspectivalism. In this regard, I will dispute the coherence of the proposal advocated by truth perspectivalism, according to which the sentences occurring in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste give rise to faultless disagreements. Also, I will show that framing these disputes as truth perspectivalism proposed, as faultless disagreements, presents major disadvantages.

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for the truth perspectivalism’s program concerning matters of personal taste, and that, with regard to the disputes like these, it cannot be both considered that they involve real disagreements and that they do not involve any error.

3. The Disagreement Aspect of Faultless Disagreement

In this section, I will present the solution proposed by Max Kölbel, one of the main proponents and defenders of the semantic program of truth perspectivalism concerning the discourse about matters of personal taste, to an argument whose conclusion establishes that no disagreement can be faultless. I will also show that this solution presents a major disadvantage for truth perspectivalism in the sense that it puts in doubt the plausibility of the claim, sustained by this theory, according to which the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning subjective matters of personal taste constitute real doxastic disagreement.

According to truth perspectivalism, in the case in which two agents $i$ and $j$ are involved in a dispute about subjective matters and one of them utters a bare sentence with a predicate of personal taste having as a semantic content the perspective-neutral proposition $[\varphi]$, while the interlocutor’s utterance expresses the perspective-neutral proposition $[\sim \varphi]$, $i$ and $j$ contradict each other.\(^{16}\) Considering that, usually, the agents say what they believe, it follows that the contents of the beliefs of $i$ and $j$ will be the same as their utterances’ semantic contents. Insofar as the agent $i$ believes the perspective-neutral proposition $[\varphi]$ expressed by his utterance, while the agent $j$ believes the perspective-neutral proposition $[\sim \varphi]$ which his utterance expresses, the condition [a], mentioned in the first section of the present paper, of what, according to truth perspectivalism, constitutes a faultless disagreement, is satisfied. With respect to their dispute arisen in a region of discourse concerning matters of personal taste, $i$ and $j$ are caught, according to truth perspectivalism, in a case of doxastic disagreement.\(^{17}\) In cases like this one, the diagnosis which truth perspectivalists offer, concerning the correctness of the mental and linguistic representations of the agents involved in disputes about matters of personal taste, is that neither agent is cognitively blamable in the sense that neither of them is at fault. But this diagnosis, and therefore, the condition [b] of what, according to truth perspectivalism, is a faultless disagreement, is called into question by an argument formulated by means of classical logic whose conclusion establishes that, in the case in which one agent $i$ believes the perspective-neutral proposition $[\varphi]$ and the other agent $j$


\(^{17}\) Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 53–73.
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believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\sim \varphi]\), one of them is cognitively at fault.

In what follows, I will present one version of this argument, more precisely the version which Max Kölbel has formulated.\(^{18}\) The argument is based on some principles considered true in classical logic. To the extent that the semantic contents expressed by the utterances of sentences occurring in regions of discourse concerning subjective matters of personal taste are truth-evaluable, the *Equivalence Schema* and the two conditionals illustrated below can be applied to them:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[ES]} & \quad [\varphi] \leftrightarrow T[\varphi] \\
\text{[ES1]} & \quad [\varphi] \rightarrow \sim T[\sim \varphi] \\
\text{[ES2]} & \quad [\sim \varphi] \rightarrow \sim T[\varphi]
\end{align*}
\]

Given that our mind and language have a representational function which is best captured in terms of the conditions which specify how the world has to be in order for the linguistic representations to be true and the mental representations to be correct, it follows that these representations are subject to a norm of truth. Accordingly, a norm of truth governing the beliefs of an agent can be defined across the following lines:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[DOX]} & \quad \text{An agent } i \text{ should believe a proposition } [\varphi] \text{ on an occasion } O \text{ only if } [\varphi] \text{ is true on } O.
\end{align*}
\]

Based on the above principle, another principle which specifies what an error is in matters of doxastic representations, and which is relevant for the version formulated by Kölbel of the argument that no disagreement is faultless, can be defined as follows:\(^{19}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[ERROR]} & \quad \text{An agent } i \text{ makes a mistake if and only if}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{the agent } i \text{ believes something that is not true.}
\end{align*}
\]

By means of the above mentioned principles and of classical logic, the argument whose conclusion establishes that no disagreement can be fault-free, can now be formulated:\(^{20}\)

(1) The agent \(i\) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\varphi]\).

Assumption

(2) The agent \(j\) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\sim \varphi]\).

Assumption

\(^{18}\) Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 56.

\(^{19}\) Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 56.

\(^{20}\) Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 56.
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(3) \( [\varphi] \)  
Assumption

(4) \( \sim T[\sim \varphi] \)  
3, [ES1]

(5) The agent \( j \) makes a mistake.  
2, 4, [ERROR]

(6) \( [\sim \varphi] \)  
Assumption

(7) \( \sim T[\varphi] \)  
6, [ES2]

(8) The agent \( i \) makes a mistake.  
1, 6, [ERROR]

(9) Either the agent \( i \) or the agent \( j \) makes a mistake.  
3-8, Dilemma

If the perspective-neutral proposition \( [\varphi] \) is true, then, applying the first conditional derived from the equivalence scheme, it follows that the agent \( j \) believes a false perspective-neutral proposition, which, according to the principle of error, constitutes a mistake. In the same vein, if the perspective-neutral proposition \( [\sim \varphi] \) is true, then, applying the second conditional derived from the equivalence scheme, it follows that the agent \( i \) believes a false perspective-neutral proposition, which means, according to the principle of error, that he makes a mistake. The conclusion of the above argument establishes that, in the case in which one agent \( i \) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \( [\varphi] \) and the other agent \( j \) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \( [\sim \varphi] \), one of them is cognitively at fault. This conclusion directly targets the condition [b] which a dispute concerning matters of personal taste must satisfy in order to constitute what, according to truth perspectivalism, is a faultless doxastic disagreement. According to this condition, the agents involved in a dispute arisen in a region of discourse about subjective matters of taste are cognitively blameless in the sense that they do not commit any error. Insofar as the above argument ensures that, no matter the matters which a dispute concerns, it is not possible for both agents involved in the dispute to be right while believing contradictory perspective-neutral propositions, the claim advocated in truth perspectivalism, according to which the disputes concerning matters of personal taste must be understood as instances of faultless disagreement, is not correct.

The strategy to which truth perspectivalists have appealed in order to block the conclusion of the above argument, and, in consequence, to save the second condition of the faultless disagreement, was to relativize to a new parameter the truth-values of the perspective-neutral propositions expressed by the utterances of
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bare sentences formed with predicates of personal taste.\textsuperscript{21} According to Kölbel, the new parameter which has to be added to the list of parameters which already included, in the Kaplanian semantic framework, a parameter for a possible world and one for a time, is a parameter representing the perspective of the agent.\textsuperscript{22} To the extent that the truth-value of a perspective-neutral proposition expressed by an agent who utters, in a context, a bare sentence formed with predicates of personal taste, is determined against the values contextually provided to the parameter for the agent's perspective, this parameter is alethically relevant. Insofar as there are different perspectives with respect to which are evaluated the perspective-neutral propositions expressed by two disputing agents which exploit, in the communication process, regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste, the claim advocated in truth perspectivalism, according to which neither agent is cognitively blamable is rescued. In conformity with this conceptual maneuver, Kölbel has offered a new principle specifying what constitutes an error in matters of doxastic representations, a principle which can be formulated across the following lines:\textsuperscript{23}

\[ \text{ERRORTP} \] An agent \( i \) makes a mistake if and only if the agent \( i \) believes something that is not true within his perspective.

If the things are understood in this way, we can ask ourselves what are the consequences of this maneuver for the first condition of the definition of what a faultless disagreement is. According to this condition, in the case in which two agents \( i \) and \( j \) are involved in a dispute arising in a region of discourse concerning matters of personal taste, and \( i \) utters, in conformity with his belief, a sentence whose semantic content is the perspective-neutral proposition \([ \varphi ]\), while \( j \) utters, in conformity with his belief, a sentence whose semantic content is the perspective-neutral proposition \([ \neg \varphi ]\), \( i \) and \( j \) doxastically disagree and contradict each other.\textsuperscript{24} But is that so?

In what follows, I will argue that, once truth perspectivalism appeals to the strategy of making the parameter for perspective alethically relevant, the first condition of what, according to this theory, is a faultless doxastic disagreement, cannot be satisfied and, in consequence, the coherence of the semantic program which truth perspectivalism advocates, with regard to sentences from regions of

\textsuperscript{22} Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 70-71.
\textsuperscript{23} Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 70.
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discourse about matters of personal taste, must be put in doubt. In order to show
that the disputes about subjective matters of personal taste, as they are framed in
truth perspectivalism, cannot constitute doxastic disagreements, I will consider, in
what follows, some scenarios in which the conditions for a real disagreement are
not met because the sentences exemplified there only apparently contradict each
other.

Suppose that, in a context $c$, Mihai utters the sentence [5] and Irina utters
the sentence [6]:

[5] I'm happy.
[6] I'm not happy.

Any sentence containing an indexical element has the property of being
context-sensitive. This means that, in order to determine what is the semantic
content which an utterance of a sentence formed with an indexical expresses in a
particular context, the appeal to context is mandatory from a semantic viewpoint.
The indexical element occurring in the surface syntax of both sentences [5] and [6]
has different semantic values. For this reason, the semantic contributions of the
indexical to what the utterances of [5] and [6] express, will not be the same. In this
case, the semantic content of the sentence uttered by Mihai in $c$ is the proposition
[Mihai is happy], while the semantic content of the sentence uttered by Irina in
the same context is the proposition [Irina is not happy]. It is clear from this
example that, even though a negation operator occurs in the surface syntax of the
sentence uttered by Irina, the sentences [5] and [6], as they are uttered in $c$, can be
simultaneously true.

Consider the following scenario: Irina lives in London and Mihai, her best
friend, calls her from Paris. In the midst of their conversation, having
the intention to talk about the weather in his location, Mihai utters the sentence


while Irina, having the intention to report how the weather is in her location, utters the sentence

[8] It's not raining.

In this scenario, uttering the sentences [7] and [8], Mihai and Irina do not
contradict each other. As what settles the value of the location parameter relevant
for the truth-value of the utterance [7] is the place in which Mihai is located, the
sentence [7] uttered by Mihai is true because, according to the above scenario, the
value of the location parameter is settled on his location, more precisely Paris.
Likewise, as the place in which Irina is located settles the value of the location
parameter relevant for the truth-value of her utterance, [8] is also true because, this time, the value of the location parameter is settled on London. Assuming that the truth-values of both utterances are established in relation to a location parameter present in the circumstances in which the utterances are evaluated, it is obvious that [7] and [8] are simultaneously true with respect to different values of the very same parameter.25

Consider now a different scenario in which Mihai inhabits a possible world \( w_1 \), while Irina inhabits another possible world \( w_2 \). Consider also that in the possible world \( w_2 \) the water has the property of being colored and that the possible world \( w_1 \) resembles the actual world we live in in that the water that can be found there is, like our water, colorless. Asked to provide a true report about the properties of water, Mihai utters the sentence [9], while Irina utters the sentence [10]:

[9] The water has no color.
[10] The water is colored.

Considering that the truth-value of any of the above utterances is established in relation to a parameter representing a possible world, it is obvious that the utterances [9] and [10] are simultaneously true with respect to the values which the present scenario ascribes to the parameter. Insofar as the possible world \( w_1 \) constitutes the value of the parameter present in the circumstance in which the utterance [9] is evaluated, \( w_1 \) is the key ingredient with respect to which the truth-value of [9] is determined. In the same vein, the truth-value of the utterance [10] is established with regard to the value that the parameter representing the possible world takes, a value which, this time, is settled on the possible world \( w_2 \). As the utterance [9] is true with respect to the possible world \( w_1 \) and the utterance [10] is true with respect to the possible world \( w_2 \), the above mentioned utterances do not contradict each other.

All of the scenarios described above display one and the same pattern. The moral that can be drawn from these cases is that when the truth-values of the semantic contents expressed by the utterances of a pair of sentences, from which one sentence represents the negation of the other, are determined in relation to different values of the parameters considered relevant for determining the utterances' truth-values, no contradiction will appear. One condition that has to be satisfied in order for a pair of sentences to constitute a contradiction is that the

negation which occurs in the syntax of a sentence has to operate on a content which is identical to the content expressed by the opposite sentence from the pair in question. Beyond the requirement of a common content, another condition that has to be satisfied, in order for a relation of contradiction to characterize a pair of sentences, is that the value of the index’s parameter relevant for determining the truth-value of the utterance of a pair’s sentence must be identical to the value of the very same parameter with respect to which the utterance of the pair’s second sentence is evaluated.

The above remarks turn out to be relevant for establishing whether the alleged cases of faultless disagreement concerning sentences with predicates of personal taste are indeed disagreement cases. Consider a scenario in which Mihai believes that ginger is tasty, Irina believes that it is not, and, in conformity with their beliefs, they utter, in the context of a dispute concerning matters of personal taste, the following sentences:


Considering this pair of sentences, can we really say that Mihai and Irina disagree each other? According to truth perspectivalism, the sentence [3] uttered by Mihai is true with respect to his tastes and false when it is evaluated with respect to Irina’s beliefs and tastes. In this theory, the variation in truth-values of the different utterances of a bare sentence containing a predicate of personal taste, like [3] above, is not due to a variation in the contents expressed by uttering the sentence [3] in different contexts. According to this theory, any utterance of the [3] expresses, in all contexts, the same perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty]. The variation in truth-values of the different utterances of [3] is explained by means of the variation in the circumstances with respect to which the semantic content of the sentence [3] is evaluated. In this sense, the truth perspectivalist proposal was, as we have seen above, to extend the list of the parameters relevant for determining the truth-values of utterances with a parameter which captures the perspective of an agent. Accordingly, all the utterances of bare sentences containing predicates of personal taste, like [3] and [4] above, have to be evaluated with respect to circumstances which include, besides a possible world parameter and a time parameter, a parameter representing the agent’s perspective. The decision to allow a parameter responsible for the agent’s perspective is methodologically motivated by the fact that even though the values of the possible

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world and time parameters are held to be constant across contexts, two utterances of a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste may have different truth-values with respect to the different values contextually assigned to the parameter representing the agent's perspective. And this, according to truth perspectivalism, is exactly what happens concerning the two utterances of bare sentences formed with a predicate of personal taste exemplified above.

The diagnosis proposed by truth perspectivalism is that the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty] expressed by the utterance of the sentence [3] is true, with respect to Mihai's perspective, and false when the very same semantic content is evaluated with respect to Irina's perspective. Likewise, the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is not tasty] expressed by the utterance of the sentence [4] will be true with respect to Irina's perspective and false when the perspective characterizing the evaluation of the ginger's taste performed by Mihai is taken into consideration. According to truth perspectivalism, insofar as the perspective-neutral propositions expressed by the utterances of the sentences [3] and [4] are contradictory propositions, Mihai and Irina doxastically disagree with each other about the taste of the ginger. In the same vein, insofar as the perspective-neutral proposition expressed by the utterance of [3] is true with respect to Mihai's perspective, while the perspective-neutral proposition expressed by the utterance of [4] is true with respect to Irina's, Mihai and Irina are both right and, therefore, their disagreement is faultless.

The dispute concerning matters of personal taste in which Mihai and Irina are involved, is framed, in truth perspectivalism, in terms of their different perspectives about one and the same thing, more precisely the taste of ginger. But giving credit to the idea that the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty] expressed by the utterance of [3] is true with respect to Mihai's perspective, while the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is not tasty] expressed by the utterance of [4] is true with respect to Irina's perspective, can we truthfully say that we have, in this case, a real doxastic disagreement?

According to classical logic, the principle of non-contradiction ensures that, with respect to all perspectives, it is not the case that [Ginger is tasty] and [Ginger is not tasty] are both true. Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction entails that there is no perspective with respect to which both [Ginger is tasty] and [Ginger is not tasty] are true. In order to have a contradiction, according to the demands of classical logic, there must be a perspective with respect to which [Ginger is tasty] and [Ginger is not tasty] are both true.

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In order for Mihai and Irina to doxastically disagree, they have to contradict each other, which means that the value of the perspective parameter, with respect to which it is established that the perspective-neutral propositions [Ginger is tasty] and [Ginger is not tasty] are both true, must be constant across the dispute between Mihai and Irina. This means that the value of the perspective parameter relevant for determining the truth-value of the utterance of [3] must be identical to the value of the very same parameter with respect to which Irina's utterance of [4] is evaluated. To the extent that the value of the alethically relevant parameter is not the same, the agents do not contradict each other, and therefore, there is no real disagreement between them.

Let us see what happens in the above case. We know from the above scenario that the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty] is true with respect to Mihai's perspective and false with respect to Irina's perspective. Likewise, the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is not tasty] is true with respect to Irina's perspective and false with respect to Mihai's perspective. In order for a contradiction between Irina and Mihai to occur, the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty] must be true and false with respect to a single perspective, that of Mihai or that of Irina. Insofar as the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is tasty] has different truth-values only with respect to two different perspectives, we cannot say that what we have, in this case, is a contradiction. Similarly, to the extent that the perspective-neutral proposition [Ginger is not tasty] is not both true and false within a single perspective, the agents do not contradict each other. Given that, in the above example, the values of the parameter representing the perspective are different, the perspective-neutral propositions expressed by the utterances of [3] and [4] do not concern the same circumstance and, therefore, they do not constitute an example of disagreement.

As the remarks above make clear, in the case in which the values of the alethically relevant parameter are different, the agents involved in a dispute arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste, do not contradict each other, and therefore, there is no real disagreement between them. As things now stand, the alternatives to which truth perspectivalists can appeal, in order to defend the claim that the agents disagree when they are involved in a dispute about subjective matters of personal taste, are either to sustain that the disagreement holds with respect to all perspectives, or to sustain that it holds with respect to a single perspective. I am assuming that the class of choices which truth perspectivalist can make in this sense, is exhausted by these two options. But, as I will argue below, neither option is satisfactory for truth perspectivalism and
therefore, both should be dismissed. In order to show that none of these two alternatives is a satisfactory way out for truth perspectivalism, a Kripke model for a modal language with perspectival operators can be conceived across the lines indicated by Steven Hales. In conformity with this proposal, the perspectival operators □ and ◊ will have the same semantic behavior as their alethic counterparts and the frame of the model, more precisely, its ontology, will consist in a set \( P \) of perspectives and a relation of accessibility which holds between the elements of \( P \), an equivalence relation understood as *compatibility* of perspectives. Given that, according to truth perspectivalism, a perspective-neutral proposition expressed by an utterance of a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste, has a truth-value only with respect to a perspective, I will deliberately ignore, in what follows, the parameter for possible worlds and, consequently, the alethic modalities. Accordingly, I will use, in the following proofs, only perspectival operators.

According to truth perspectivalism, there is a contradiction between the perspective-neutral propositions expressed by the sentences [3] and [4] uttered by Mihai and Irina. To the extent that they believe contradictory propositions, Mihai and Irina disagree. If it is considered that the fact of their disagreement holds with respect to all perspectives, according to the first alternative to which truth perspectivalism would appeal, in order to defend the first condition of the faultless disagreement, then it will be true, with respect to all the perspectives compatible with the perspective advocated by a truth perspectivalist, that a contradiction between Mihai and Irina takes place. In this case, one of the effects is that truth perspectivalism can no longer keep separated the regions of discourse concerning subjective matters of personal taste and the regions of discourse concerning objective matters of fact. Accordingly, if the fact that Mihai and Irina disagree holds with respect to all perspectives, one of them must be at fault and, in consequence, the *faultless* aspect of their dispute concerning the matters of their personal tastes is completely compromised. Even though these effects are left aside, the logic supports the opposite claim, according to which it is not the case that, with respect to all the perspectives compatible with the perspective advocated by truth perspectivalists, a contradiction holds. Considering that \( \varphi \) and \( \neg \varphi \) are two formulae from the above mentioned modal language with perspectival

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Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement

operators which correspond to the sentences [3] and [4] uttered by Mihai and Irina, we have:

(1) \( \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi \)

(2) \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \varphi \)

(3) \( \varphi \lor \neg \varphi \)

(4) \( (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \land (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \varphi) \land (\varphi \lor \neg \varphi) \)

(5) \( ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \land (\sigma \rightarrow \tau) \land (\varphi \lor \sigma)) \rightarrow (\psi \lor \tau) \)

(6) \( ((\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi) \land (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \varphi) \land (\varphi \lor \neg \varphi)) \rightarrow (\Diamond \varphi \lor \Diamond \neg \varphi) \)

(7) \( \Diamond \varphi \lor \Diamond \neg \varphi \)

(8) \( (\varphi \lor \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \varphi \land \psi) \)

(9) \( (\Diamond \varphi \lor \Diamond \neg \varphi) \rightarrow (\neg \Diamond \varphi \land \neg \Diamond \neg \varphi) \)

(10) \( \neg (\neg \Diamond \varphi \land \Diamond \varphi) \)

(11) \( \neg (\Box \neg \varphi \land \Box \varphi) \)

(12) \( \neg (\varphi \land \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \)

(13) \( \neg (\neg \varphi \land \Box \varphi) \rightarrow (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \Box \varphi) \)

(14) \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \Box \varphi \)

(15) \( \neg (\varphi \land \neg \varphi) \rightarrow \neg (\Box \varphi \land \neg \varphi) \)

(16) \( \neg (\varphi \land \neg \varphi) \)

(17) \( \neg (\varphi \land \neg \varphi) \)

(18) \( \neg \Box (\varphi \land \neg \varphi) \)

(19) \( \neg \Box \bot \)

\[ T - \text{Theorem} \]

1, Substitution \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \)

\[ L_{\varphi} - \text{Theorem} \]

1, 2, 3, \( L_{\varphi} - \text{Theorem} \)

Constructive Dilemma

\[ 5, \text{Substitution} \psi / \Diamond \varphi, \sigma / \neg \varphi, \tau / \Diamond \neg \varphi \]

4, 6, Modus Ponens

\[ L_{\varphi} - \text{Theorem} \]

8, Substitution \( \varphi / \Diamond \varphi, \psi / \Diamond \neg \varphi \)

7, 9, Modus Ponens

10, Df. \( \Box \)

\[ L_{\varphi} - \text{Theorem} \]

12, Substitution \( \varphi / \Box \neg \varphi, \psi / \Box \Diamond \neg \varphi \)

11, 13, Modus Ponens

14, Substitution \( \varphi / (\varphi \land \neg \varphi) \)

\[ L_{\varphi} - \text{Theorem} \]

16, Necessitation

15, 17, Modus Ponens

18, Df. \( \bot \)

The remaining alternative for truth perspectivalists would be to consider that the fact that Mihai and Irina disagree holds with respect to a particular perspective. If this were the case, then it would be possible to find a perspective
compatible with the perspective advocated by a truth perspectivalist with respect to which Mihai and Irina contradict each other in the above scenario. But this conflicts with our modal intuition supported by the following proof and, in consequence, should be rejected:

\[
(1) \sim (\phi \land \sim \phi) \\
(2) \Box \sim (\phi \land \sim \phi) \\
(3) \sim \Diamond (\phi \land \sim \phi) \\
(4) \sim \Diamond \bot
\]

$L_{\phi}$– Theorem
1, Necessitation
2, Df. $\Diamond$
3, Df. $\bot$

What the last line of the above reasoning shows is that there is no perspective, compatible with the perspective advocated by truth perspectivalists, with respect to which a contradiction holds. But, given that the compatibility relation between perspectives is reflexive, a truth perspectivalist has access to his perspective, more precisely its perspective is compatible with herself. Given that there is no perspective, compatible with the perspective advocated by truth perspectivalists, with respect to which a contradiction between Mihai and Irina holds, and that, by the reflexivity property of the relation of compatibility, a truth perspectivalist has access to his perspective, it follows that, with respect to his perspective, there is no disagreement between Mihai and Irina, a result which truth perspectivalism cannot happily welcome.

All the above examples show that, if the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste are construed in a truth perspectivalist fashion, as Kölbl has indicated, they do not represent authentic examples of doxastic disagreements. The take-home lesson is that, once truth perspectivalism appeals to the strategy of making the parameter for perspective alethically relevant, the first condition of what, according to this theory, is a faultless doxastic disagreement, cannot be satisfied and, in consequence, the coherence of the semantic program which truth perspectivalism advocates, with regard to sentences from regions of discourse about matters of personal taste, must be put in doubt.

4. The Faultless Aspect of Faultless Disagreement

If the disagreement aspect advocated by truth perspectivalism with regard to different evaluations made by agents involved in disputes arising in regions of discourse about matters of personal taste cannot be secured, as the previous section...
showed, what can be said now about the correctness of their evaluations? In this sense, as we have already seen in the second section of the present paper, truth perspectivalists defend the idea that the evaluations offered by agents involved in disputes about matters of personal taste are subjective and, consequently, they are fault-free. According to truth perspectivalism, the scenario above in which Mihai believes that ginger is tasty while Irina believes that it is not, make obvious that neither Mihai nor Irina can be said to be at fault in believing what they do. Therefore, they are both cognitively blameless and no error can occur as far as subjectively different perspectives are concerned. Granting for the moment the truth perspectivalist’s idea that the scenario above, in which Mihai utters the sentence [3] and Irina utters the sentence [4], constitutes a standard instance of a doxastic disagreement, can the faultless aspect of the agents’s disagreement be sustained? More precisely, it is safe to infer from the data according to which the perspective-neutral proposition expressed by the utterance of [3] is true with respect to Mihai’s perspective and false with respect to Irina’s perspective that the alleged disagreement between Mihai and Irina is a faultless one? The answer to this question is, as Mark Richard rightly observed, a definite no.31 Before presenting Richard’s argument that, on the basis of the fact that the truth-values of the perspective-neutral propositions involved in a case of dispute are determined against different values of the perspective parameter, we cannot draw the conclusion that the dispute in question is faultless, it must be said that truth perspectivalists can make use of a disquotational predicate of truth in their semantics. As Cappelen and Hawthorne have shown, truth perspectivalism allows at the object-language level a disquotational operator It is true that that conforms to the following semantic definition:32

\[ DQ \] The content It is true that \( \phi \) is true at an \( n \)-tuple of parameters if and only if the content \( \phi \) is true at that \( n \)-tuple.

The \( n \)-tuple of parameters in relation to which the truth-values of the utterances of bare sentences formed with predicates of personal taste are determined, must include, as we have seen in the previous section, beyond the parameters for possible worlds, for times and perhaps for other relevant things, a parameter for perspective. By allowing the introduction into the object-language of a disquotational truth operator and extending the list of parameters with a parameter representing the agent’s perspective, truth perspectivalists are

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committed to sustain that, from a particular perspective, the content $\varphi$ is semantically equivalent with the content *it is true that* $\varphi$. Or, as Mark Richard would put it, “within a perspective, truth is ‘disquotational.’”\textsuperscript{33}

As things stand now, the argument offered by Mark Richard, in favour of the idea that the second condition of the faultless disagreement, which ensures that a dispute arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste is faultless, is not met, can now be formulated.\textsuperscript{34} Consider that $\varphi$ is a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste and that an agent $i$ validly judges that $\varphi$ is the case if the semantic content expressed by his utterance of the sentence $\varphi$, that is the perspective-neutral proposition $[\varphi]$, is true with respect to the agent’s perspective. According to truth perspectivalism, in the case in which another agent $j$ doxastically disagrees with the agent $i$ about the subjective matters expressed by $\varphi$, $j$ validly judges that it is not the case that $\varphi$. In this case, the perspective-neutral proposition $[\neg \varphi]$ is true from the perspective adopted by $j$. If the agent $i$ validly judges that $\varphi$, granting that the truth is disquotational from a perspective, it will be correct to say that the agent $i$ validly judges that the utterance of

\begin{itemize}
  \item [11] *It is true that* $\varphi$.
\end{itemize}

is true. Therefore, the perspective-neutral proposition $[T(\varphi)]$ will be true with respect to the perspective from which the agent $i$ regards the subjective matters expressed by $\varphi$. In the same vein, it will also be correct to say that the agent $j$ validly judges that the utterance of

\begin{itemize}
  \item [12] *It is not true that* $\varphi$.
\end{itemize}

is true and that the perspective-neutral proposition $[\neg T(\varphi)]$ is true with respect to his perspective. Insofar as the proposition $[T(\varphi)]$ and the proposition $[\neg T(\neg \varphi)]$ are equivalent, it will be correct to say about $i$ that he validly judges that the utterance of

\begin{itemize}
  \item [13] *It is false that not-$\varphi$.
\end{itemize}

is true. But an agent who validly judges the utterance of [13] to be true, will be committed to see anyone who believes that the utterance of [12] is true as making an error. As the agent $j$, who doxastically disagrees, according to truth perspectivalism, with the agent $i$, believes that the utterance of [12] is true, $i$ will be justified to judge that $j$ is at fault. Insofar as the same pattern of inference can


be replicated with regard to what the agent $j$ validly judges, neither agent involved in the alleged doxastic disagreement concerning matters of personal taste cannot regard his interlocutor as not committing an error. With respect to the above remarks, Mark Richard correctly observed that

This line of reasoning is sound no matter what the object of dispute. So it is just wrong to think that if my view is valid — true relative to my perspective — and your contradictory view is valid — true, that is, relative to yours — then our disagreement is ‘faultless.’

What the argument offered by Mark Richard highlights is that, granting the truth of the premise according to which the truth-values of the perspective-neutral propositions involved in a dispute about subjective matters of personal taste are determined against different values of the perspective parameter, the conclusion that the dispute in question is faultless cannot be inferred. Therefore, the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste are not fault-free and the second condition of the faultless disagreement advocated by truth perspectivalism, according to which the agents involved in disputes about subjective matters are cognitively blameless in believing what they do, cannot be sustained.

To this line of thought, a defender of truth perspectivalism’s proposal, that neither agent involved in a doxastic disagreement concerning matters of personal taste commits an error, can reply, as Boghossian noted, that the norms governing the correctness of beliefs and other cognitive attitudes which operate in the argument put forward by Richard cannot be those offered by invariantists. In this sense, as we have seen in the previous section, Max Kölbel has already offered a principle specifying what constitutes an error in matters of doxastic representations, a principle which was formulated as follows:

$$\text{[ERROR}_\tau\text{]} \quad \text{An agent } i \text{ makes a mistake if and only if the agent } i \text{ believes something that is not true within his perspective.}$$

Based on this principle, the maneuver of response of truth perspectivalists would consist in adopting, to the extent that matters of personal taste and not objective matters of fact are concerned, a norm for beliefs across the following lines:

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37 Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” 70.
An agent $i$ should believe a proposition $\phi$ on an occasion O only if on O, $\phi$ is true from the perspective of $i$.

But is the above principle which specifies what an error is in matters of doxastic representations adequate with regard to the psychology of agents involved in disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste? The already mentioned definition of error entails that insofar as the agents do not believe things that are false with respect to their perspectives, they are without fault and, consequently, they are cognitively blameless. But this way of defining what an error is in matters concerning personal tastes is psychologically too strong and therefore implausible. It is like saying that life is not worth living because we do not have wings to fly. What truth perspectivalism accomplishes with this definition of error is that it raises the standards of error such high that no agent involved in a dispute about subjective matters can touch them and, consequently, no disputing agent can make such an error. And if this kind of error does not occur, the faultless aspect of the doxastic disagreement defended by truth perspectivalism is secured. But how, it can be asked, can an error of this kind occur? According to the above definition of error, when it is the case that an agent $i$ believes the perspective-neutral proposition $\neg \phi$ and the proposition $\phi$ is true with respect to his perspective, the agent $i$ is at fault. But, given the fact that a sentence $\phi$ concerns nonfactual matters involving the personal tastes of the agent $i$, how can it be possible that $i$ believes the perspective-neutral proposition $\neg \phi$ while the proposition $\phi$ is true with respect to his perspective? If the proposition [Ginger is tasty] is true with respect to the perspective of $i$, how can $i$ believe that ginger is not tasty? In matters concerning the personal tastes of an agent $i$, believing a proposition $\phi$ and accepting the fact that $\phi$ is true within the perspective of $i$, are not separated. In this sense, it cannot be objectively established that something is true with respect to the perspective of $i$ without taking into consideration $i$’s perspective. In cases like this one, the perspective of $i$ is the only relevant criterion we dispose of in order to establish that something is true with respect to his perspective. If a proposition $\phi$ is true with respect to the perspective of $i$ and the subject matter of the sentence $\phi$ uttered in a context by $i$ concerns matters of his personal taste, granting that $i$ knows, through introspection, what his tastes are, he comes to know $\phi$. After all, the agent $i$ is the only expert as far as his tastes are concerned! And if only $i$ know best the matters of his personal taste, then $i$ will know $\phi$ and therefore, he will believe $\phi$. Given now the fact that $i$ believes $\phi$ and $\phi$ is true with respect to his perspective, no error can occur.
In the other sense, if the agent \(i\) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\neg \varphi]\), he could not believe the proposition \([\neg \varphi]\) based on an objective criterion external to his perspective. In order to establish that \(i\) commits an error in the case in which \(i\) believes the proposition \([\text{Ginger is not tasty}]\) while the proposition \([\text{Ginger is tasty}]\) is true with respect to his perspective, it must be established that his belief is separated from what is true within his perspective. But given that, concerning matters of his personal tastes, his beliefs are grounded on his perspective, the agent \(i\) will believe that ginger is not tasty on the basis of his perspective about ginger. And if \(i\) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\text{Ginger is not tasty}]\) based on his perspective about the taste of ginger, then the proposition \([\text{Ginger is not tasty}]\) will be true with respect to \(i\)'s perspective while the proposition \([\text{Ginger is tasty}]\) will be false within the very same perspective. In this case too, what \(i\) believes will be identical to what is true from his perspective.

The moral that can be drawn from the above considerations is that the definition of error at which truth perspectivalists appeal in order to save the faultless aspect of what they pretend to be a doxastic disagreement has no psychological plausibility. Therefore, it cannot be conceded to truth perspectivalists that the above definition of error is operative in the cases involving disputes about matters of personal taste which they interpret to be instances of doxastic disagreement. As things stand now, the result cannot be favorable to truth perspectivalism. Consider that for an agent \(i\) involved in a dispute concerning subjective matters of personal taste there are only two possibilities: he is at fault or he does not commit any error, _tertium non datur_.

Consider firstly that the agent \(i\) is at fault. According to the definition of error to which truth perspectivalists appeal, the perspective-neutral proposition \([\varphi]\) is true with respect to the perspective of \(i\), while \(i\) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\neg \varphi]\) which his utterance of a bare sentence containing a predicate of personal taste expresses. Suppose that another agent \(j\), involved in a dispute about matters of personal taste with \(i\), commits no mistake. In this case, \(j\) believes the perspective-neutral proposition \([\neg \varphi]\) and the very same proposition expressed by his utterance is true with respect to his perspective. Insofar as \(j\) believes the same thing as \(i\) and \(i\) commits an error, truth perspectivalists cannot secure neither the faultless aspect of the dispute between \(i\) and \(j\), nor what they pretend to be its disagreement aspect.

Suppose now that the agent \(i\) commits the same mistake as above, while the agent \(j\) is cognitively blameless with respect to the perspective-neutral proposition \([\varphi]\). In this case, \(j\) believes the very same thing which is true with respect to his perspective. As the disagreement aspect of the dispute about matters of taste is
framed, in truth perspectivalism, in doxastic terms, and as the agent $i$ believes the proposition $[\neg \varphi]$ expressed by his utterance, while the agent $j$ believes, in this case, the proposition $[\varphi]$ which his utterance expresses, it follows, according to truth perspectivalism, that they disagree. But as far as the perspective-neutral proposition $[\varphi]$ is true with respect to the perspective of the agent $i$, the faultless aspect of the alleged disagreement about personal tastes is lost in this case. Also, the cases in which both agents involved in a dispute about matters of personal taste are at fault, are of no help for truth perspectivalists even though, in some of these cases, one agent will believe and express by his utterance the perspective-neutral proposition $[\varphi]$, while the other will believe and linguistically express, in conformity with his belief, the opposite perspective-neutral proposition $[\neg \varphi]$.

The remaining cases that are of interest for truth perspectivalists are cases in which one agent $i$ involved in a dispute about matters of personal taste believes $[\varphi]$, the other agent $j$ believes $[\neg \varphi]$, both of them utter bare sentences formed with predicates of personal taste expressing what they believe, and what each agent believes is true with respect to his own perspective. These are the cases in which, according to truth perspectivalism, faultless doxastic disagreements will occur. But, as I have already shown in the previous section, in cases like these, given that the values of the alethically relevant parameter representing the perspective are different, the perspective-neutral propositions believed by the agents $i$ and $j$ and expressed by their utterances do not concern the same circumstance, and therefore, these cases do not constitute instances of doxastic disagreements.

What all alternative cases presented above emphasize is that, to the extent that the disputes occurring in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste are conceived in a truth perspectivalist manner, more precisely, as doxastic disagreements which are fault-free, one cannot consider both that these disputes involve real disagreements and that they do not involve any cognitive or factual error.

5. Conclusion

All of the above remarks are in a perfect concordance with what other researchers have found with regard to the proposal advocated by truth perspectivalism, according to which the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning subjective matters of personal taste constitute faultless doxastic disagreements.39 In

this sense, with respect to pairs of perspective-neutral propositions expressed in contexts by utterances of opposed sentences with predicates of personal taste, I showed that, when the values of the alethically relevant parameter representing the perspective are different, the perspective-neutral propositions do not concern the same circumstances and, therefore, they do not constitute real instances of disagreement. Also, I showed that the alternative according to which the alleged disagreements of agents involved in disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste hold with respect to all perspectives, is not a satisfactory way out for truth perspectivalism. In order to ensure that the disputes about subjective matters are fault-free and, accordingly, that the distinction between regions of discourse concerning subjective matters of personal taste and regions of discourse concerning objective matters of fact is maintained, truth perspectivalism defined what an error is, in matters of personal taste, in a way which, as I have already shown, is psychologically too strong and therefore implausible. The take-home lesson is that, insofar as the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning matters of personal taste are construed in a truth perspectivalist manner, they do not constitute, as I have shown, authentic examples of faultless doxastic disagreements and, in consequence, the coherence of the semantic program which truth perspectivalism advocates, with regard to sentences from regions of discourse about matters of personal taste, must be put in doubt.\footnote{This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU 159/1.5/S/133675. Thanks to Adrian Ludușan, Mihai Rusu, and Alexandru Dragomir for valuable comments and helpful discussions.}